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The use of ﬁnancial incentives to change health-related behaviour is often opposed by members of the
public. We investigated whether the acceptability of incentives is inﬂuenced by their effectiveness, the
form the incentive takes, and the particular behaviour targeted. We conducted discrete choice experi-
ments, in 2010 with two samples (n ¼ 81 and n ¼ 101) from a self-selected online panel, and in 2011 with
an ofﬂine general population sample (n ¼ 450) of UK participants to assess the acceptability of incentive-
based treatments for smoking cessation and weight loss. We focused on the extent to which this varied
with the type of incentive (cash, vouchers for luxury items, or vouchers for healthy groceries) and its
effectiveness (ranging from 5% to 40% compared to a standard treatment with effectiveness ﬁxed at 10%).
The acceptability of ﬁnancial incentives increased with effectiveness. Even a small increase in effec-
tiveness from 10% to 11% increased the proportion favouring incentives from 46% to 55%. Grocery
vouchers were more acceptable than cash or vouchers for luxury items (about a 20% difference), and
incentives were more acceptable for weight loss than for smoking cessation (60% vs. 40%). The accept-
ability of ﬁnancial incentives to change behaviour is not necessarily negative but rather is contingent on
their effectiveness, the type of incentive and the target behaviour.
 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd.Open access under CC BY license. Introduction
Smoking, poor diet, and physical inactivity contribute to a range
of chronic diseases and explain much of the variation in premature
mortality (Beaglehole et al., 2011). Health care providers seek
effective ways to change these behaviours. There is increasing
interest in programmes that pay individuals contingent upon
changing their health-related behaviour (Marteau, Ashcroft, &
Oliver, 2009). There is evidence of effectiveness in smoking cessa-
tion in pregnancy (Bauld & Coleman, 2009; Lumley et al., 2009) and
drug treatment programmes (Lussier, Heil, Mongeon, Badger, &
Higgins, 2006) but there is currently less evidence regarding their
effectiveness in weight loss programmes (Volpp et al., 2008) and
programmes for general smokers (Cahill & Perera, 2008; Volpp
et al., 2006) with one exception, which used large incentives
(Volpp et al., 2009).
Such programmes have provoked negative reactions from the
public, especially when they involve cash payments (Long, Helweg-tre for the Study of Incentives
ing, London SE1 9RT, UK.
M. Promberger).
ess under CC BY license. Larsen, & Volpp, 2008; Parke, Ashcroft, Brown, Marteau, & Seale,
2011; Priebe et al., 2010). Given equally effective alternative treat-
ments, incentive-based ones are less acceptable to US and UK
participants (Promberger, Brown, Ashcroft, & Marteau, 2011). In
a qualitative study assessing attitudes towards using ﬁnancial
incentives for medication adherence, however, many participants
stated that effectiveness was the most important factor in deter-
mining the acceptability of offering ﬁnancial incentives (Priebe
et al., 2010, p. 466), and in a recent poll, acceptability of plain
cigarette packaging increased with increasing effectiveness (ASH,
2011).
Against this background, the current studies aim to investigate
the extent to which people are willing to trade off dislike of
incentive programmes against an explicit gain in treatment effec-
tiveness.We focus on smoking cessation andweight loss, two of the
health contexts for which there is much interest in using ﬁnancial
incentives to improve population health (Cahill & Perera, 2008;
Paul-Ebhohimhen & Avenell, 2008).
Methods
We conducted three studies, the third built on the ﬁrst two.
Studies 1 and 2 were conducted online in 2010 and Study 3 was
Table 2
Example of a choice pair for Study 1.
Treatment A Treatment B
The patient receives The patient receives
vouchers for healthy groceries standard medication
worth £50 per month for
not smoking.




This treatment is proven
to help
20 out of 100 treated. 10 out of 100 treated.
Which treatment should be funded?
[ ] Treatment A
[ ] Treatment B
M. Promberger et al. / Social Science & Medicine 75 (2012) 2509e25142510conducted in 2011 by a research agency in high streets in ﬁve UK
cities. The research was approved by the King’s College London
PNM ethics committee (online studies; PNM/09/10-89) and
covered by the professional code of conduct of the Market
Research Society (for the research agency). In all three studies, we
used discrete choice experiments (DCEs) to assess how readily
accepted were incentive-based treatments of different types and
levels of effectiveness relative to standard treatments of a ﬁxed
level of effectiveness. DCEs ask participants to select among
several options, across a range of choice sets to reveal strength of
preferences and how these are affected by the factors varied in the
DCE.
Design
Studies 1 and 2 assessed acceptability of incentive-based
treatments for smoking cessation and weight loss, respectively.
Table 1 shows the factors and levels. Each combination of incentive
type and incentive effectiveness was presented against a constant
comparator of “standardmedication” at 10% effectiveness, resulting
in a three (incentive effectiveness)  three (incentive type) within-
subject design. Ten percent effectiveness was chosen because it is
a broadly plausible level of effectiveness for both conditions
(Padwal, Rucker, Li, Curioni, & Lau, 2003; Shaw, Gennat, O’Rourke, &
Del Mar, 2006; Stead, Perera, Bullen, Mant, & Lancaster, 2008).
Study 3 built on the online studies to replicate and extend the
ﬁndings in an ofﬂine sample. We included both treatment contexts
in one study to enable direct comparison. We also included a factor
level for which the incentive is less effective than the constant
comparator (5% vs. 10%), to compare with trade-offs in the other
direction, and one for which the effectiveness increase is very small
(11% vs. 10%), to assess sensitivity to small effectiveness increases.
To keep the number of choice pairs manageable, we dropped the
incentive type of luxury itemvouchers, as its effect was no different
to cash in Studies 1 and 2. This gave a two (treatment con-
text) ﬁve (incentive effectiveness) two (incentive type) within-
subject design. We changed the constant comparator wording to
“standard treatment” for weight loss, to avoid any potential inﬂu-
ence of lack of familiarity of medication-based treatments in this
context.
Material
Table 2 shows an example of a choice pair. When the treatment
context was weight loss, incentives were for “meeting weight loss
targets” and standard medication or treatment “for weight loss”.
£50 per month was the same for all choice pairs, and is an amountTable 1
Discrete choice experiment factors and levels used in Studies 1, 2 and 3.
Factor Levels in Study 1
and Study 2






















effectivenesstypical for such incentive programmes (e.g., Ballard & Radley, 2009:
£12.50 per week; Marteau, Thorne, Aveyard, Hirst, & Sokal,
submitted for publication: £752 over 58 weeks). We made the
standard treatment of equivalent cost.
For each treatment context, we added one choice pair as
a dominance check comparing standard treatment at 10% effec-
tiveness with standard treatment at 20% effectiveness. This check
and intransitive choices (rejecting the incentive, but accepting it at
lower effectiveness) were measures of inconsistency.
Studies 1 and 2 were conducted online. In each part, the 10
choice pairs were presented one at a time; the order was
randomized for each participant, as was the position of the constant
comparator (left vs. right) in each pair. This was followed by
additional questions about the topic and about gender, age, and
education.
For Study 3, the material was in a booklet, starting with the
choice tasks, followed by questions about the topic and about
gender, age, education, and postcode. We asked whether partici-
pants were overweight (never e formerly e slightly e very) and
whether they smoked (never e have quit e not daily e daily). The
22 choice pairs were grouped by treatment context; order of the
contexts was randomized. Within each context, the eleven choice
pairs were presented in one of four different randomly generated
orders. The position of the constant comparator alternated (left vs.
right).
All study material is available as Supplementary material online.
Participants and procedure
For Studies 1 and 2, participants were recruited through an
online panel (http://participate-in-research.org.uk). Only panel
members registered as UK residents aged over 18 years were con-
tacted; for Study 2 nobody was contacted who had completed
Study 1. Participants were sent an email with a link to the study and
paid £3 (US$ 4.8) for completion through the panel. Panel members
self-select by signing up to the website to “participate in online
academic research and get paid a small amount of money.” The
resulting sample is a convenience sample comprised of members of
the general public with an internet connection. About 400 partic-
ipants were invited to Study 1 and were informed that recruitment
would close at 80 participants. About 300 participants were invited
to Study 2 and informed recruitment would close at 100 partici-
pants. Each study closed after about 48 h.
For Study 3, participants were recruited through a research
agency (Wyman Dillon, http://wymandillon.co.uk) in ﬁve cities
across the UK (Birmingham, Bristol, London, Manchester, North-
ampton), aiming for similar numbers of men and women and
participants of different education levels. Participants were
approached in a high street and asked whether they would take
part in a survey about health care treatments. They completed the
M. Promberger et al. / Social Science & Medicine 75 (2012) 2509e2514 2511questionnaire on their own at desks in a venue rented for the
purpose and were paid £4 (US$6.4) for their participation.
Data analysis
We used mixed effects logistic regression models with partici-
pant random effects to analyze choices (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker,
2011; R Development Core Team, 2011). Random effects account
for the non-independence of data from the same participants
(Probit models gave qualitatively identical results).
Choice of the standard medication or treatment was coded as
0 and choice of the incentive as 1. Incentive type and incentive
effectiveness were independent variables. For Study 3, treatment
context was an additional independent variable, as was the inter-
action between treatment context and incentive type. The models
estimate relative preference of the incentive treatment at different
factor levels over standard treatment at 10% effectiveness. Details of
the analysis and models are available from the authors.
In addition, to judge absolute acceptance of the incentive rela-
tive to standard treatment at the same level of effectiveness, we
used ChieSquare tests to test the null hypothesis that 50% choose
the incentive.
We excluded participants from the analyses who may not have
understood the task or not taken it seriously, based on the domi-
nance check, on intransitive choices and on response times in the
online studies (see supplementary material).
We included non-traders (participants always choosing stan-
dard treatment regardless of incentive effectiveness), given that
some people are strongly opposed to health incentives (Parke et al.,
2011; Promberger et al., 2011). Our aim was to establish whether
and how people trade off their dislike for incentives against effec-
tiveness, therefore we included participants who never accepted
incentive treatments, even when they were much more effective.
Results
Participants
Table 3 shows the characteristics of participants in all studies.Table 3
Demographic characteristics of study participants.
Study
Online? Online
Original sample size n ¼ 81
n after exclusions based on inconsistency
checks (representing x% of original sample)
79 (96
Mean age in years (SD) 46.82
Women (n(%)) 47 (58
Education (n(%)):






Smoking status (n (%))
Currently smoke 21 (27
Have quit 23 (29
Never 30 (38





Never 32 (32Study 1 and Study 2
Fig. 1 shows the proportions of participants choosing the
incentive-based treatments in each condition in Study1andStudy2.
Table 4 shows the model coefﬁcients representing the inﬂuence
of the incentive treatment characteristics on whether it is chosen
over 10% effective standard medication. The model uses treatment
contrasts for the categorical variables, comparing effectiveness
levels 20 and 40% each with the reference level 10%, and luxury
item and grocery vouchers each with cash. A positive coefﬁcient
corresponds to that factor level strengthening preference for the
incentive. Age, gender and education had no effect when included
and are not included in these models.
For both smoking cessation and weight loss, increasing incen-
tive effectiveness to 20% and 40% each signiﬁcantly increases its
acceptability compared to incentive-based treatment at 10% effec-
tiveness. As Fig. 1 shows, this effect is non-linear: increasing
effectiveness to 20% has a proportionately larger effect than
increasing it to 40%.
For smoking cessation, cash (Χ2 ¼ 15.50, p < 0.001) and luxury
voucher incentives (Χ2 ¼ 10.65, p < 0.01) are less well accepted
than equally effective standard medication, but vouchers for
healthy groceries are accepted equally well as standard medication.
For weight loss, there is no evidence for lower acceptability of cash
or luxury item vouchers, and grocery vouchers are better accepted
than equally effective standard treatment (Χ2 ¼ 20.60, p < 0.001).
For smoking cessation and weight loss, 11 (14%) and 4 (4%)
participants always rejected the incentive-based treatment,
respectively (“non-traders”).
A further 21 (27%) consistently refused at least one incentive
type for smoking cessation, most of them cash (14); 21 (21%) did so
for weight loss, most of them luxury item vouchers (14).Study 3
Fig. 2 shows the proportion of participants choosing the
incentive treatment over standard treatment at 10% effectiveness in
each condition in Study 3; model coefﬁcients are in Table 5, with
reference levels “10% effectiveness”, “cash” and “smoking1 Study 2 Study 3
Online Ofﬂine
n ¼ 101 n ¼ 517
%) 99 (98%) 450 (87%)
(14.89) 44.07 (14.54) 43.77 (17.53)
%) 58 (59%) 217 (48%)
5 (5%) 87 (19%)
%) 12 (12%) 81 (18%)
%) 26 (26%) 60 (13%)
) 19 (19%) 61 (14%)
%) 34 (34%) 123 (27%)
3 (3%) 21 (5%)




%) Have quit 118 (16%)
%) Never 216 (48%)
Very overweight 44 (10%)
%) Slightly overweight 163 (36%)
%) Formerly overweight 46 (10%)


































































































































































M. Promberger et al. / Social Science & Medicine 75 (2012) 2509e25142512cessation” for the categorical variables. Age, gender and education
had no effect and are not included in the model.
As in Studies 1 and 2, increasing the effectiveness of an
incentive increases its acceptability and this effect is again non-
linear. Notably, in aggregate, participants are sensitive even to
the small increase in effectiveness from 10% to 11%. Not surpris-
ingly, lowering the effectiveness of the incentive to 5% reduces its
acceptability.
Incentives are more acceptable for weight loss. Grocery
vouchers are more acceptable than cash in both contexts, and they
increase acceptability in the context of weight loss more than they
do for smoking cessation (interaction term). At equal effectiveness,
cash incentives are less acceptable than standard treatment for
smoking cessation (Χ2 ¼ 132.10, p < 0.001) and for weight loss
(Χ2 ¼ 13.58, p < 0.001). For weight loss, grocery vouchers are more
acceptable than standard treatment (Χ2 ¼ 78.54, p < 0.001).
Separate models including participants’ overweight and
smoking status and their interaction with incentive type show that
both the very overweight and daily smokers are more in favour of
incentive-based treatments than thosewhowere never overweight
or never smoked (see Table 6).Table 4
Model coefﬁcients and conﬁdence intervals for Study 1 and Study 2.
Factor/Factor level Coefﬁcients [95% conﬁdence interval]
Study 1 (smoking
cessation)




1.68*** [2.53, 0.83] 0.16 [0.81, 0.49]
Effectiveness: 20% 2.36*** [1.77, 2.94] 1.73*** [1.24, 2.22]
Effectiveness: 40% 2.81*** [2.20, 3.42] 2.61*** [2.06, 3.16]
Type: grocery vouchers 1.70*** [1.12, 2.28] 2.00*** [1.44, 2.55]
Type: luxury item vouchers 0.04 [0.49, 0.56] 0.23 [0.69, 0.23]
Model based on n observations
(n participants)
711 (79) 891 (99)
P-values based on Wald tests.
*** < 0.001.26 participants (6%) always rejected the incentive-based treat-
ment, regardless of effectiveness, type, or context (“non-traders”).
A further 184 (41%) consistently refused at least one combination of
incentive type and context at any effectiveness, most of them (154)
cash for smoking cessation.
Discussion
The acceptability of incentive-based treatments increases with






























Grocery vouchers for weight loss
Cash for weight loss
Grocery vouchers for smoking cessation
Cash for smoking cessation
Fig. 2. Proportion of participants choosing the incentive in each condition over stan-
dard medication or standard treatment at 10% effectiveness in Study 3.
Table 5
Model coefﬁcients and conﬁdence intervals for Study 3.






Effectiveness: 5% 1.75*** [1.93, 1.56]
Effectiveness: 11% 0.56*** [0.39,0.72]
Effectiveness: 20% 1.14*** [0.97,1.31]
Effectiveness: 40% 1.61*** [1.43, 1.79]
Type: grocery vouchers 1.24*** [1.09, 1.40]
Context: weight loss 1.04*** [0.89, 1.20]
Interaction: Context weight
loss  Type: grocery vouchers
0.38*** [0.16, 0.60]
Model based on n observations
(n participants)
8981 (450)
P-values based on Wald tests.
*** < 0.001.
M. Promberger et al. / Social Science & Medicine 75 (2012) 2509e2514 2513dislike of incentive treatments against effectiveness. Acceptability
also variedwith incentive type, with grocery vouchers seen asmore
acceptable than cash or luxury items. Cash incentives for smoking
cessation were less acceptable than standard treatment. All
incentives were more acceptable for weight loss than for smoking
cessation. Grocery vouchers were particularly well accepted for
weight loss.
Lower acceptability of cash incentives for smoking cessation
than standard treatment was also found in a previous study among
UK and US participants (Promberger et al., 2011) andmirrors media
portrayals (Parke et al., 2011). It is also reﬂected by non-smokers
rejecting an effective programme for smokers employed in the
same organization (Volpp, Asch, Galvin, & Loewenstein, 2011). The
higher acceptability of incentives for weight loss may reﬂect
different levels of “moralization” of the two behaviours, a process
conferring moral signiﬁcance to health-related behaviours (Rozin,
1999). Such moralizing could explain higher acceptance of
grocery vouchers than cash, with the former seen less as a “reward”
for morally reprehensible behaviour.
This is supported by grocery vouchers being particularly well
accepted for weight loss (Study 3). As we described them, vouchers
for “healthy groceries” may have been seen as instrumental for
weight loss, and seen as a treatment rather than a reward. The
lower acceptability of smoking cessation incentives by those who
never smoked than by those who smoked daily, and lower
acceptability of weight loss incentives by those who were never
overweight than the very overweight, might also reﬂect moralizing
among those not afﬂicted. Alternatively, it could reﬂect self-interestTable 6
Coefﬁcients of models of choices about smoking cessation treatment and weight loss trea
Smoking cessation
Factor/factor level Coefﬁcient [95% CI]
Intercept 1.94*** [2.30; 1.57]
Effectiveness: 5% 1.83*** [2.12; 1.54]
Effectiveness: 11% 0.62*** [0.37; 0.86]
Effectiveness: 20% 1.31*** [1.06; 1.56]
Effectiveness: 40% 1.87*** [1.62; 2.13]
Type: grocery vouchers 1.46*** [1.29; 1.63]
Smoking: have quit 0.11 [0.63; 0.41]
Smoking: not daily 0.24 [0.84; 1.33]
Smoking: daily 0.69* [0.12; 1.26]
Model based on n
observations (n participants)
4419 (443)
P-values based on Wald tests.
*** < 0.001; * < 0.05.of smokers and overweight participants in being offered such
rewards. Previously, Long et al. (2008) had also found smokers and
obese patients to be more likely to endorse incentive programmes
than non-smokers and non-obese respondents. Two components
underlie the non-linear effect of effectiveness on acceptability: ﬁrst,
some participants are very sensitive to effectiveness, and even an
increase of one percentage point overrides their dislike of ﬁnancial
incentives; second, some participants are strongly opposed to
incentives and are unwilling to accept them even at 40% effec-
tiveness. Such a “vocal minority” might impede implementation of
incentives (Volpp et al., 2011).
10% standard treatment effectiveness may have lowered partic-
ipants’perceptions of standard treatment effectiveness compared to
their perceptions had they not been given explicit information. In
this case, providing only information on incentive effectiveness
would likely lower acceptance of incentive treatments. On the other
hand, acceptance might be higher if the standard vs. incentive
effectiveness difference were presented in relative rather than
absolute terms (“100% increase in effectiveness”).
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study examining how
acceptability of incentives varies with their stated effectiveness,
and the ﬁrst study comparing the acceptability of different incen-
tive types. We speciﬁed simpliﬁed monthly costs of £50 for both
incentive and standard treatment. As this does not capture the full
costs of either intervention, we relied on participants ignoring
other costs, or assuming them to be similar across treatment types.
Specifying costs for both treatments increases the validity of our
ﬁndings: the cost of standard treatment may otherwise be
neglected compared to that of ﬁnancial incentives. The choice
between alternatives with the same cost and clearly stated effec-
tiveness may result in more favourable views of incentive pro-
grammes than other methods of preference elicitation such as
direct ratings of incentive programmes, more commonly used by
media and opinion polls.
Participants may have interpreted grocery vouchers for weight
loss to have higher than stated effectiveness, and future studies
should attempt to check for this by assessing perceived effective-
ness. Our study was conducted with UK participants. Promberger
et al. (2011) have previously found very similar attitudes to
incentive treatments in UK and US participants. The study would
merit replication in a US sample to conﬁrm whether the results
would be applicable to US health policy decisions.
If public policy aims to maximize health beneﬁts, this means
funding the most cost-effective treatment for any given health
condition. Dislike of incentives may reﬂect public preferences for
non-health related concerns about fairness and equity (e.g., Dolan,
Shaw, Tsuchiya, &Williams, 2005). Such preferences are not alwaystment including participants’ smoking and overweight status respectively (Study 3).
Weight loss







Overweight: formerly 0.59 [0.13; 1.31]
Overweight: slightly 0.21 [0.26; 0.68]
Overweight: very 0.93* [0.19; 1.66]
4402 (441)
M. Promberger et al. / Social Science & Medicine 75 (2012) 2509e25142514well-reﬂected and consistent (Ubel, Baron, & Asch, 2001), and we
do not address the question of how they should be traded off
against effectiveness. However, our studies show that in aggregate,
participants do make these trade-offs. If incentive-based treat-
ments are found to be effective, this should be clearly communi-
cated to improve the acceptability of effective treatments. As
shown, even small increases in effectiveness may considerably
boost acceptability. Our studies also show vouchers for healthy
groceries are better accepted than cash; making them preferable if
equally effective. This ﬁndingmight extend to other incentives with
health promoting characteristics; future research should establish
which incentive characteristics have this effect.
Future research about attitudes towards health incentives, and
indeed about attitudes to other novel health interventions such as
plain packaging for cigarettes, should take into account people’s
willingness to trade off initial opposition to them against increased
effectiveness. When assessing acceptability of incentive-based pro-
grammes, the cost of standard medication should be stated to make
treatments comparable. A minority of participants are not willing to
accept incentive treatments even if they are four times as effective as
standard treatment. Future research should improve the under-
standing of their motivations and implications for policy: concerns
about consequences such as motivation “crowding out” call for
establishing evidence about these consequences,while reluctance to
reward “immoral” health behaviours of the day requires judgement
how to weigh such sentiments against tangible consequences.
Notwithstanding these issues, these studies have shown a clear
preference, in our UK samples, for using ﬁnancial incentives to
change health-related behaviours when those incentives are shown
to bemore effective than other behaviour change interventions and
when they do not involve cash.
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